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Homomorphic-Encrypted Volume Rendering
Sebastian Mazza, Daniel Patel, and Ivan Viola
Fig. 1. Two decrypted images rendered by our simplified transfer function approach. The left image is rendered from a CT scan of a
waterglobe and other objects inside a box that is wrapped inside a present box [12]. The dataset used for rendering the right image is a
CT/PET scan of the thorax from a patient with lung cancer (G0061/Adult-47358/7.0 from the Lung-PET-CT-Dx dataset [4,20]).
Abstract—Computationally demanding tasks are typically calculated in dedicated data centers, and real-time visualizations also follow
this trend. Some rendering tasks, however, require the highest level of confidentiality so that no other party, besides the owner, can read
or see the sensitive data. Here we present a direct volume rendering approach that performs volume rendering directly on encrypted
volume data by using the homomorphic Paillier encryption algorithm. This approach ensures that the volume data and rendered
image are uninterpretable to the rendering server. Our volume rendering pipeline introduces novel approaches for encrypted-data
compositing, interpolation, and opacity modulation, as well as simple transfer function design, where each of these routines maintains
the highest level of privacy. We present performance and memory overhead analysis that is associated with our privacy-preserving
scheme. Our approach is open and secure by design, as opposed to secure through obscurity. Owners of the data only have to keep
their secure key confidential to guarantee the privacy of their volume data and the rendered images. Our work is, to our knowledge, the
first privacy-preserving remote volume-rendering approach that does not require that any server involved be trustworthy; even in cases
when the server is compromised, no sensitive data will be leaked to a foreign party.
Index Terms—Volume Rendering, Transfer Function, Homomorphic-Encryption, Paillier
1 INTRODUCTION
Volume rendering is extensively used in domains where the underly-
ing data is considered highly confidential. One example includes the
field of medicine, where CT, MRI, or PET data are used for diagnostic
or treatment-planning purposes. Another such example is hydrocar-
bon and mineral exploration in energy industries for inspecting the
subsurface using seismic scans.
For volume rendering, privacy can currently only be achieved by
storing and processing the datasets locally. Volume rendering requires
computers with large memory and powerful processing power. Such
hardware must be frequently maintained and upgraded. Therefore,
for many organizations, it would be advantageous to outsource the
rendering to cloud services. As cloud services remove the need to be
in close proximity to the rendering hardware, users can now also view
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volume rendering on thin clients that do not have the required memory
or processing power, such as tablets and smart phones. However,
hospitals must protect sensitive personal data and energy companies
must protect their valuable data assets. Thus, it is essential that their
data is not visible to the cloud services, as these either cannot be trusted,
or their security might be compromised. Therefore, we want to make
it possible to perform direct volume rendering on untrusted hardware
while preserving the same level of privacy for the datasets as the privacy
achieved with a classical local rendering approach.
The basic concept of our privacy-preserving approach is shown in
Figure 2. First, the data is acquired and immediately encrypted by, for
example, a machine that is directly connected to a medical scanner.
Then the encrypted volume is uploaded to the honest-but-curious1 [25]
public server. This is done only once per volume. When the clients
that hold the secure key request rendering, the server performs ray-
casting directly on the encrypted volume data. This computation results
in an image containing encrypted values, which is then sent to the
client. When the client receives the requested image, it is decrypted
and displayed to the user. As the server that computed the rendered
image will only see encrypted data, our approach maintains privacy.
Our design is constrained by three requirements. The first require-
1The server will perform the algorithm it is requested to compute honestly
(correctly); however, there is the potential for possible access by the curious
eyes of administrators or hackers.
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Fig. 2. Our approach consists of a computer that produces, encrypts, and sends volume data to a server, which then renders the data and sends the
result to a client. The client decrypts and visualizes the result. The text that belongs to encrypted data or processing is stated in red.
ment is that the privacy of the user data is protected by the design
of the algorithm and does not depend on hiding implementation de-
tails, keeping any part of the system secret, or any other obscure tech-
nique that cannot be secure, at least not in the long run (Kerckhoffs’s
principle [17]). Such obscure techniques only make it difficult to
know the actual security of the system. Therefore, the security of our
volume rendering approach solely depends on the security of a well-
established cryptographic algorithm, continuously being scrutinized in
cryptographic research. We have chosen the well-established Paillier
cryptographic algorithm, which is partly homomorphic [24]. The key
property of homomorphic encryption (HE) is that arithmetic operations
on encrypted data are dual to arithmetic operations on plaintext (origi-
nal, unencrypted) data. This enables an algorithm to perform a correct
3D volume rendering image synthesis directly on the encrypted data,
without being able to ever access the plaintext data. As a consequence,
the result of the rendering on the server is an encrypted image.
We are currently not able to show interactive frame rates with the
proof-of-concept implementation of our approach. However, one future
research goal should attempt to make a remote rendering system fast
enough to achieve this. This leads to our second requirement, which
is to only use techniques that will not prevent the system from scaling
the performance with the computational power available on the server
and will not prohibit interactive frame rates. The third requirement is
to support thin clients without much memory and computational power.
As a result, we consider the client to be a low powered device, which is
connected to a mobile or another medium-bandwidth network, while
we assume that the server is a powerful machine (e.g., with multiple
professional GPUs) or even a compute cluster.
By using encryption schemes like AES [7], it is currently possible
to store volume datasets securely in the cloud. However, for rendering
images from the datasets, the entire volume needs to be downloaded and
decrypted first, and then rendered on the client. A privacy-preserving
remote volume rendering can also make the cloud more attractive as a
storage space for volume data, because with our proposed technique,
it is no longer necessary to download the whole dataset before images
can be synthesized from it.
2 RELATED WORK
We have only found two works that address the topic of privacy-
preserving rendering of volumetric data. The most similar work to
ours is that of Mohanty et al. [22]. They present a cryptosystem for
privacy-preserving volume rendering in the cloud. Unlike our approach,
they achieve correct alpha compositing. However, to attain this goal,
they end up with a solution that cannot be considered secure, that has a
fixed transfer function, and that requires that the volume is sent from
one server to another server for each rendered frame.
Their approach requires two servers for rendering: a Public Cloud
Server and a Private Cloud Server. The first step of their rendering
approach is to apply a color and opacity to each voxel before encrypting
the volume. This means that the transfer function is pre-calculated and
cannot be changed by a user without performing a time-consuming
reencryption and uploading of the volume. In the next step, the en-
crypted data is uploaded to the Public Cloud Server, which stores the
volume data. When the Public Cloud Server receives an authorized ren-
dering request from a client, the server calculates all sample positions
for the requested ray casting and interpolates the encrypted color and
opacity values for each sample position. All interpolated sample values
then need to be individually sent to the Private Cloud Server, which
decrypts the opacity value of each sample in order to perform the alpha
blending along the viewing rays. For alpha compositing, the opacity
values of samples represent object structures in the volume; therefore,
anyone who can gain access to the Private Cloud Server, such as an
administrator or a hacker, will be able to observe these structures in the
volume dataset. If an unauthorized person has access to this server, the
whole approach collapses. For the task of encrypting and decrypting
parts of the volume data on the servers, their approach requires a central
Key Management Authority (KMA). While this brings the advantage
that an organization can centrally control which users have access to a
specific volume, it enlarges the attack surface of their system consider-
ably, because the KMA has all keys required for decrypting all volume
data. Therefore, the confidentiality of the KMA is constitutional for the
privacy of all datasets, no matter who they belong to.
Another weakness of their approach is the required network band-
width between the Public and the Private Cloud Server because all
sample values of a ray casting frame need to be transferred from the
Public and the Private Cloud Server (more than 1GB). With our ap-
proach, the privacy of the volume data and rendered image depends
only on a single secure key. Also, our approach should scale linearly
with the computing power of the hardware it is running on.
Chou and Yang [3] present a volume rendering approach that at-
tempts to make it difficult for an unintended observer to make sense
of the volume dataset that resides on a server. This is done by, on the
client’s side, subdividing the original data into equally sized blocks.
The blocks are rearranged in a random order and then sent to the server
as a volume. The server then performs volume rendering on each block
and sends the result back to the client, which will reorder the individual
block renderings and composite them to create a correct rendering. To
obfuscate the data further, on the client’s side, the data values in each
block are changed using one out of three possible monotonic operations:
flipping, scaling, and translating. Monotonic operations are used as they
are invertible and associative under the volume rendering integration.
Therefore, doing the inverse operators on the resulting rendering gives
the same result as doing them on the data values before performing the
rendering. This algorithm cannot be considered safe, and the authors
acknowledge this as they state that the goal is only to not trivially reveal
the volume to unauthorized viewers. A possible attack would be to
consider the gradient magnitude of the obfuscated volume. This should
reveal the block borders. The gradient magnitude can further be used
inside each block to reveal structures in the data that can be used for
aligning the blocks correctly.
To attain our goal of developing an approach that is open and se-
cure by design, we use the Paillier cryptosystem developed by Pail-
lier in 1999 [24]. This cryptosystem is an asymmetric encryption
scheme, where the secure key contains two large prime numbers p and
2
© 2020 IEEE. This is the author’s version of the article that has been published in IEEE Transactions on Visualization and
Computer Graphics. The final version of this record is available at: xx.xxxx/TVCG.201x.xxxxxxx/
q, and the public key contains the product N (modulus) of p and q.
The cryptosystem supports an additive homomorphic operation (⊕).
If this operation is applied to two encrypted values Jm1K,Jm2K (JmK
means encrypted m), the decrypted result is the sum of the m1 and m2
(Dec(Jm1K⊕ Jm2K) = (m1 +m2) mod N). Furthermore, a homomor-
phic multiplication (⊗) between an encrypted value and a plaintext
value d is supported (Dec(Jm1K⊗d) = (m1×d) mod N). Since Pail-
lier’s cryptosystem does not carry over multiplication of two encrypted
values to plain text, it is classified as a partially homomorphic encryp-
tion (PHE) scheme. Paillier can securely encrypt many values (e.g.,
5123 voxels of a volume) from a small number space (e.g., 210 possible
density values), because it is probabilistic, which means that during the
encryption, the obfuscation can map a single plaintext value randomly
to a large number of possible encrypted values. This makes a sim-
ple “probing” for finding out the number correspondence impossible.
Further details about Paillier’s cryptosystem such as the encryption
and decryption algorithm is provided in the Supplementary material
document. We are limited to the arithmetic operations supported by
Paillier for creating a volume rendering that captures as much structure
as possible from the data. This forces us to think unconventionally and
creatively when designing the volume renderer.
For homomorphic image processing, the work by Ziad et al. [38]
makes use of the additive homomorphic property of Paillier’s cryptosys-
tem. They demonstrate that they are able to implement many image
processing filters using the limited operations allowed with Paillier.
They implement filters for negation, brightness adjustment, low pass
filtering, Sobel filter, sharpening, erosion, dilation and equalization.
While most of these filters are computed entirely on the server side,
erosion, dilation, and equalization require the client for parts of the
computation. There are various works that make use of such a trusted
client protocol approach to overcome the limitation of a PHE scheme
and enable operations such as addition, multiplication, and comparisons
on the encrypted data [5, 6, 34]. A trusted client knows the secure key
and can, therefore, perform any computation on the data or convert
/ re-encrypt it from one encryption scheme to another (e.g., from an
additive to a multiplicative homomorphic encryption). These client-side
computations introduce latency because the data needs to be transferred
back and forth between the server and the client. Furthermore, the
client needs to have enough computational power to avoid becoming
the bottleneck of the system. To mitigate this problem, automated
code conversions can be used that minimize the required client side re-
encryptions [5, 6]. While a trusted client approach could theoretically
solve many of the problems we face with our untrusted server-only
approach, it is not practical for volume rendering. The most demanding
problems of volume rendering, such as transferring a voxel value and
advanced compositing (alpha blending, maximum intensity projection,
...), need to be done per voxel. Hence, every voxel that could contribute
to the image synthesis (all voxels of a volume for many rendering
cases) needs to be transferred to the trusted client and processed there
for every rendered frame. The encryption and decryption on the client
side are more expensive than the operations required for a classical
sample compositing due to the size of encrypted values (e.g., 1000
bit per voxel). If an amount of data in the range of the volume itself
needs to be transferred from the server to the client, where the data
would need to be encrypted and decrypted, it is pointless to perform
any calculations on the server, because the client then has more work
to do than in a classical volume rendering on the client. Moreover, it
does not save any network traffic as compared to a simple download,
decrypt, and process use case. Therefore, we argue that trusted client
approaches are not suitable for our work. Furthermore, a trusted client
approach will not work with thin clients, which contradicts our third
requirement. Our second requirement is also contradicted because, in
real-world use cases, the network bandwidth between a client like a
tablet computer and a cloud server will not have enough bandwidth
(e.g., more than 1Gbit/s) to support interactive frame rates.
3 ENCRYPTED RENDERING OVERVIEW
The first step of the introduced privacy preserving rendering system
is the encryption of the volume dataset (Figure 2 Acquisition Device).
During the encryption stage, every single scalar voxel value of a volume
dataset needs to be encrypted with Paillier’s approach (see Algorithm 5
in the Supplementary Material document). Meta data of the volume
such as width, height, depth and the storage order of voxels will not be
encrypted. The next step is to upload the encrypted volume dataset to a
server (Figure 2 arrow from Acquisition Device to Cloud Server). For
our approach, the device that encrypts the volume and uploads it to a
server does not even need the secure key, because for encryption, only
the public key is required.
When a rendered image is requested to be shown on a client, the
client sends a rendering request to the server, which has the encrypted
volume dataset (Figure 2 arrow from Client to Cloud Server). The
rendering request contains further information about the settings of
the rendering pipeline, such as the camera position, view projection,
and (depending on the selected rendering type) also information about
the transfer function that should be used. After the server receives
such a rendering request, it uses the included pipeline settings and
the already stored encrypted volume dataset to render the requested
image (Figure 2 the rendering pipeline stages of the Cloud Server). To
preserve privacy, the server does not have the secure key and can not,
therefore, decrypt the volume data. The operations that are used for
rendering an image from an encrypted volume dataset are limited to
the homomorphic operations add (⊕) and multiply with plaintext (⊗),
which are defined for Paillier’s encryption scheme. When the rendering
is finished, the server will send the calculated image data to the client
(Figure 2 arrow from Cloud Server to Client). The resulting image that
the client receives is still encrypted. Decrypting such an image is only
possible for a client that knows the correct secure key. For everyone
else, the image will be random noise (shown in Supplementary Video
Material). Since every single pixel value is an encrypted number, every
single pixel can be decrypted independently of the other pixels. For a
gray-scale image, that means one number per pixel. An RGB colored
image requires three values that need to be decrypted per pixel.
In Section 4, we explain how the homomorphic operations of Pail-
lier’s HE can be used for X-ray sample integration. Furthermore, we
will show how to use Paillier’s cryptosystem with floating-point num-
bers, which allows us to perform trilinear interpolation. Section 5
explains a more advanced approach that allows the emphasizing of
different density ranges in the rendered images.
4 ENCRYPTED X-RAY RENDERING
Ray-casting [19] is the most frequently used approach for volume ren-
dering. Furthermore, ray-casting based algorithms can be easily and
efficiently parallelized and can be implemented with fewer memory
reads than slicing-based algorithms. Memory access is time-consuming,
especially if every number that needs to be read is thousands of bits
long. Therefore, we implement our privacy-preserving volume render-
ing approach with ray-casting. However, other direct volume rendering
approaches developed for unencrypted data, such as slicing, can be
used as well. Slicing on the server can be built by the same encrypted
rendering pipeline components (sampling / interpolation, color map-
ping, compositing), which we will explain anon. Slicing could also be
used to just perform the sampling on the server, transfer the slices to
the client, and perform the compositing there. However, this would not
fulfill our requirements because of the required network bandwith and
the high computational requirement on the client.
The ray casting algorithm first calculates a viewing ray for every
pixel of the final image (Figure 2 Ray Traversal - stage of the Server).
These viewing rays will be calculated based on the camera position, up
vector, opening angle, image resolution, and pixel index. At discrete
and equidistant steps along the ray, the data of the volume is sampled
(Figure 2 Sampling - stage of the Server). The last step is the composit-
ing, where the final pixel value is calculated based on the sample values
of a viewing ray (Figure 2 Compositing - stage of the Server).
X-ray rendering is a volume rendering approach where the sample
value is mapped to a white color with monotonically increasing opacity,
and the compositing is a summation followed by a normalization at
the end of the ray traversal. If the sampling of the voxel values is
done by nearest-neighbor filtering, the sum along a viewing ray can be
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(a) Nearest Neighbor (b) Trilinear Interpolation
Fig. 3. Results from encrypted X-ray rendering showing nearest neighbor
(a) and Trilinear interpolation (b), which we also support.
calculated by only using the homomorphic add operation (⊕) which
is already defined for Paillier’s cryptosystem. The final normaliza-
tion of all samples along a view ray cannot be done directly by the
homomorphic operations of Paillier’s encryption scheme because this
requires a division that can result in a non-integer value that is not
supported. However, the server could send the encrypted sum together
with the sample count to the client, which can perform the division
after decrypting the sum.
To improve the nearest-neighbor sampling with trilinear interpo-
lation, a mechanism that allows the summing and normalization of
encrypted values (Jm1K, Jm1K), which are scaled by some plaintext
weights (α1, α2), is required. For plaintext integers, the interpola-
tion could be implemented around the integer arithmetic operations
add, multiply, and divide (1D example: (m1 ·α1+m2 ·α2)/(α1+α2)).
Since an arbitrary division is not supported by Paillier’s cryptosystem,
this is not directly feasible on encrypted data. A possible solution could
be to use fraction types, which has an encrypted denominator and a
plaintext numerator for storage and calculations. After the image is
rendered, which contains such fractions as pixel values, the client can
download it, decrypt the denominators, and perform the deferred divi-
sions2. However, we decided to use a floating-point encoding, which is
easier to implement and allows a shader code development as is usual
for hardware accelerated rendering. With a floating-point representa-
tion of encrypted values, it is possible to multiply the eight neighboring
voxels of a sample position with the distances between the samples
and voxel position. These distances, which have a sum of 1.0, are the
weights of the interpolation (1D example: m1 ·α1+m2 ·α2). A floating-
point encoding will also make the final division of the sample sum for
X-ray rendering on the server side possible. While a floating-point
encoding does not directly enable divisions in the encrypted domain,
it can be used to approximate a division by a multiplication with the
reciprocal of the divisor, as shown in Equation 1.
∑
n
≈ Dec
(q
∑
y⊗⌊1
n
·10γ
⌉)
·10−γ (1)
The sum of samples along a viewing ray is denoted as ∑, and n is the
count of samples. The precision of the approximation is defined by
the count of decimal digits γ (e.g., γ = 3 for thousandth). Before the
reciprocal of n is multiplied with ∑, the comma is moved γ digits to
the right (·10γ ) and then rounded (be). The multiplication with 10−γ ,
which moves the comma back to the correct position, can be achieved
by subtracting γ from the exponent of the floating-point encoded result.
Since the Paillier cryptosystem is defined over ZN , the result is only
correct if no intermediate result is greater than N−1.
We will discuss the used floating-point encoding in Section 4.1.
Figure 3 shows two images that were rendered from an encrypted
2If the rendering pipeline is designed in a very static way, it is theoretically
possible to know the final numerator upfront and let the client perform the
required division without explicitly specifying the numerator. However, this is
very inflexible, error prone, and requires an update for the client whenever a
change on the server leads to a change of the final numerator.
floating-point encoded dataset. For the rendering of the left image, a
nearest-neighbor sampling was used, and for the right image, a trilinear
interpolation was used. The used dataset contains three objects with
different densities: a solid cube in the center wrapped inside a sphere
and another sphere at the top left front corner. The same dataset is also
used for renderings shown in Figure 4 and Figure 6.
4.1 Encrypted Floating-Point Numbers
A floating-point number is defined as m · be, where m is called the
mantissa. The exponent e defines the position of the comma in the
final number. The base b is a constant that is defined upfront (e.g.,
during the compilation of the application). We used a decimal system
for convenience; therefore, our prototype uses b = 10. However, b can
be any positive integer that is greater or equal to 2.
To calculate with floating-point arithmetic in the encrypted domain,
we have chosen to use the approach developed for Googles Encrypted
BigQuery Client [11]. The idea is to store the mantissa m and the
exponent e of a floating-point number in two different integer variables.
During the encryption of the floating-point number (m,e), only the
mantissa m is encrypted using Paillier’s cryptosystem. The exponent
e remains unencrypted, which results in the floating-point number
(JmK,e). This floating-point number representation is also used by the
python-paillier library [28], the Java library javallier [28] and in the
work by Ziad et al. [38].
For an addition of two such encrypted floating-point numbers, both
need to have the same exponent. Therefore, the exponents of both
numbers must be made equal before the actual addition, if they are
not already equal. Hence, it is not possible to increase the exponent if
the mantissa is encrypted because that would require a homomorphic
division of the encrypted mantissa, which is not possible. Therefore, the
floating-point number with the greater exponent needs to be changed.
On the other hand, decreasing the exponent of a floating-point number
is not a problem because it requires a homomorphic multiplication of
the encrypted mantissa with a plaintext number, which is possible with
Paillier. Equation 2 shows how to calculate the new mantissa JmnK that
is required for decreasing the exponent of the floating-point number
(JmoK, eo) to the lower exponent en. The new floating-point number
is defined as (JmnK, en), which represents exactly the same number as
(JmoK, eo). It is just another way to store it.JmnK= JmoK⊗beo−en (2)
When both floating-point numbers (Jm1K, e1) and (Jm2K, e2) have the
same exponent e1 = e2 = en, the homomorphic sum JmsK of both man-
tissas can be calculated by the add operation defined for Paillier , which
results in the final floating-point number (JmsK, en). The Algorithm 1
shows this approach for summing two floating-point numbers with
encrypted mantissas. The lines from 2 to 10 bring the exponents of
both floating-point numbers to the same value (en), and line number 11
contains the addition of the encrypted mantissas.
A multiplication with a floating-point number that contains an en-
crypted mantissa (Jm1K, e1) and a floating-point number with a plaintext
mantissa (m2, e2) can be achieved by multiplying the mantissas with
the multiplication operation defined for Paillier (JmnK= Jm1K⊗m2 )
and a plaintext addition of the exponents (en = e1 + e2). This is also
stated in line 10 and 11 of the Algorithm 2, which is sufficient for
a correct result. The lines from 2 to 9 contain a performance opti-
mization, which prevents the intermediate result of JmeKmd , which
is computed before modN2 is applied in line 10, from being unnec-
essarily large. This optimization is also used by the python library
python-paillier [28] in paillier.py and the java library javallier [15]
in PaillierContext.java.
Signed numbers can be represented by using a two’s complement
representation for the mantissa m. The exponent e does not change. If
v is a negative integer, the two’s complement in the integer modulo N
can be calculated by: m = v+N. In the encrypted domain, the additive
inverse −m of m is defined by the multiplicitive inverse JmK−1 = JiK
of JmK in the integers, modulo N2 (JiK is defined by: JmK · JiK = 1
mod N2 and can be computed from JmK and N2 by the extended Eu-
clidian algorithm [18]). This complement representation for encrypted
4
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Algorithm 1: Paillier Floating Point Add
Parameters :Encrypted mantissas Jm1K,Jm2K and plaintext
exponents e1,e2 of the two floating point numbers
that should be summed.
b is the used base, e.g. 10 for a decimal system.
Result: Encrypt mantissa JmsK and plaintext exponent en.
1 procedure fpAdd(Jm1K, e1, Jm2K, e2)
2 if e1 > e2 then
3 Jm1K= Jm1K⊗be1−e2
4 en = e2
5 else if e1 < e2 then
6 Jm2K= Jm2K⊗be2−e1
7 en = e1
8 else
9 en = e1
10 end
11 JmsK= Jm1K⊕ Jm2K
12 return {JmsK, en}
Algorithm 2: Paillier Floating Point Multiply
Parameters :Encrypted mantissa Jm1K, plaintext mantissa m2 and
the plaintext exponents (e1,e2) of the two floating
point numbers that should be multiplied.
N is the modulus of the used public key.
Result: Encrypt mantissa JmnK and plaintext exponent en.
1 procedure fpMultiply(Jm1K, e1, m2, e2)
2 mn = N−m2 // negative of m2
3 if mn ≤ max. value that can be encrypted by current N then
4 JmeK= Jm1K−1 mod N2
5 md = mn
6 else
7 JmeK= Jm1K
8 md = m2
9 end
10 JmnK= JmeK⊗md
11 en = e1 + e2
12 return {JmnK, en}
numbers can also be used for a subtraction of two encrypted numbers.
Since, the first operand of a subtraction can be added to the additive
inverse of the second operand (Dec(Jm1−m2K) =Dec(Jm1K×Jm2K−1
mod N2)).
With the floating-point encoding explained in this section, it is pos-
sible to perform a trilinear interpolation of voxel values because the
encrypted voxel values can be multiplied by the fractional distances be-
tween a sample position on a viewing ray and the actual voxel position.
Furthermore, divisions of an encrypted number (JmK,e) by a plaintext
number d can be approximated by a multiplication of the encrypted
number (JmK,e) with the reciprocal (b1/d ·10γe ,−γ) of d (γ defines
the precision - compare with Equation 1).
5 TRANSFER FUNCTION
In this section, we discuss the challenges of building a transfer function
approach that works for a probabilistic PHE scheme, and we show
a novel and practical solution for a simplified transfer function. It
is not possible to use the transferred values for an alpha blending
sample compositing because this would require a multiplication of two
encrypted values, which is not possible with Paillier’s cryptosystem.
However, the transfer function can be used to highlight specific density
ranges at X-ray rendering, which helps an observer to distinguish
between different objects inside a volume.
A transfer function for non-encrypted voxel values can be imple-
mented as an array with the possible voxel values as indices and the
assigned color as values of the array. The evaluation of such a trans-
fer function is as simple as reading the value from the array at the
index, which is equal to the voxel value that should be mapped. How-
ever, this cannot be efficiently implemented for encrypted data. For
non-encrypted voxel values, such a transfer function array will have
a length that is equal to the amount of possible voxel values, which
is only 28 = 256 for 8-bit voxels or 210 = 1024 for 10-bit voxels. An
encrypted volume dataset will probably not contain two equal voxel
values, because of the obfuscation during the encryption. That means
an encrypted dataset will probably have as many different voxel values
as it has voxels. Therefore, an array as transfer function will not work
because it would be at least as big as the volume itself.
Another approach for non-encrypted data is to store just some sup-
porting points that contain the density and color. The evaluation for
this transfer function approach is achieved by interpolating the color
between the value of the next lower and next greater supporting point.
To find the neighboring supporting points of the voxel value that should
be transferred, comparison operators such as lower than (<) or greater
than (>) are required. However, comparison operators cannot exist for
probabilistic PHE schemes like Paillier because that would break its
security (see Section 7.3). Therefore, the question is how to implement
a function f : X → Y that can map finite sets of numbers X to another
set of numbers Y by just using the operations add (⊕) and multiply with
constant (⊗). The result of this function is again an encrypted number.
A promising approach that can achieve this was presented by Wamser
et al. [36] in their work on “oblivious lookup-tables”.
5.1 Oblivious Lookup Tables
Let X = {x1,x2, ...,xn} be an enumeration of values that should be
mapped to Y = {y1,y2, ...,yn} by the lookup function f (xi) = y1. The
idea is to create a vector ~vi for every xi ∈ X with the same cardinality as
X (|~vi|= |X |) and define the evaluation of a lookup by the dot product
~vi ·~l = yi. The scalar value yi is the result of the lookup. For a transfer
function, this would be the value of one color channel. The vector~l can
be calculated form the linear equation V ·~l =~y. V is a square matrix
of full rank with n = |X |, that uses all vectors ~vi as rows. However,
this linear equation needs to be solved only once. Therefore, the client
can calculate~l upfront based on unencrypted numbers. The equation
V ·~l =~y has a unique solution, if all vectors ~vi are linearly independent.
Hence, the crucial part is to find an approach to extrapolate every vector
~vi only from one single xi so that the ~vi are linearly independent from
each other. Wamser et al. [36] suggest to use a Vandermonde-Matrix as
V (Equation 3), because it fulfills these requirements.
V =

1 x11 x
2
1 · · · xn−11
1 x12 x
2
2 · · · xn−12
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 x1n x
2
n · · · xn−1n
 (3)
From the creation rule of the Vandermonde-Matrix, it follows that
a ~vi, which is equal to the i-th row of the matrix V , is defined as
~vi = (1,x1i ,x
2
i , · · · ,xn−1i ). The lookup function f (xi) can, therefore, be
stated as:
f (xi) = (1,x1i ,x
2
i , · · · ,xn−1i ) ·~l = yi (4)
The dot product in Equation 4 can be calculated even if ~vi =
(1,x1i ,x
2
i , · · · ,xn−1i ) is encrypted because only the operations add (⊕)
and multiply (⊗) that are defined for the Paillier HE are required for
calculating a dot product. However, it is not possible to calculate the
vector ~vi from an encrypted JxiK, because this would involve multipli-
cations of two encrypted numbers, which is not possible with Paillier.
A theoretical solution for this could be to store the vector ~vi instead
of scalar xi as the value of a voxel. For a volume dataset, where the
voxel values have only a resolution of 8 bits, this would lead to a vector
length of n = 28 = 256. Therefore, the required storage size for the
volume will increase 256 times.
A volume with 512× 512× 512 voxels and a resolution of 8
bits per voxel requires 5123 · 8 bits/8 bits = 134,217,728 Bytes =
128 MB. The same volume encrypted by Paillier HE with a pub-
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(a) X-ray (b) emphasized density: 0.653
(c) emphasized density: 0.331 (d) emphasized density: 0.781
Fig. 4. First image shows an X-ray rendering result for comparison
with the other three images that are created by our encrypted density
emphasizing approach. The volume density values are encoded with
4-dimensional vectors.
lic key length that can be considered as secure (2048 bits) requires
5123 ·2 ·2048bits/8bits = 64 GB. If the scalar voxel values xi are re-
placed by the vectors ~vi with a length of 256, the volume will require
64 GB ∗ 256 = 16TB. While a volume dataset with 16 Terabyte is
probably better than a transfer function that is at least as big as the
encrypted volume, the overhead in terms of storage and computation
is still too big to be practical. Therefore, we develop a simplified and
novel transfer function approach with a considerably lower storage
overhead, which we discuss in the next two sections.
5.2 Density Range Emphasizing
Our simplified transfer function approach is based on the observation
that it is possible to compute the dot product of a vector with encrypted
values and a vector with plaintext values. Furthermore, the dot product
can be used to calculate an encrypted scalar value indicating the similar-
ity of an encrypted vector and a plaintext vector. This will work if both
vectors have length 1. Therefore, our approach is to encode the density
values of each voxel as a vector and encrypt each component of this
vector by the Paillier encryption algorithm (Supplementary Material
Algorithm 5). In order to highlight a user-defined density range, the
density value at the center of this range needs to be encoded as a vector.
Note that this vector is not encrypted. The encrypted volume rendering
engine can now compute the dot product between this vector and the
encrypted vector of a sample position. Then the ray-casting algorithm
needs to sum up the results of the dot products along a ray instead
of the density values. This approach allows a user to emphasize a se-
lectable density range in the rendered image. Figure 4 contains images
that were created using this approach. The top left subfigure shows a
result of an X-ray rendering for comparison. All other subfigures show
results for different density ranges that are emphasized. The density
that is encoded as vector that was used for the dot-product calculation
is specified in the caption of each sub figure.
The density-to-vector encoding scheme we used is based on an
HSV-to-RGB color conversion. The exact encoding scheme is stated
in Algorithm 3. Figure 5 illustrates the magnitude of the vector com-
ponents for all possible density values. Furthermore, the response
intensities for user-defined emphasizing densities at 0.45 and 0.85 are
shown. At the last line of Algorithm 3, the calculated vector is normal-
ized. This is important to make sure that the result of the dot product
is always between 0 and 1 and to ensure that the highest possible dot
product result (1) is at the user-defined emphasizing density.
There are other and possibly better density-to-vector encoding
schemes. However, the HSV-based encoding leads to results that feel
natural, especially while smoothly increasing or decreasing the empha-
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Fig. 5. Visualization of density encoded as 3 dimensional (left) and 6
dimensional (right) vectors. The scalar value (density) of the voxel is
represented on the x-axes. The magnitude of each vector component at
a specific density is represented by the curves. The first component is
drawn in red, the second in green, red, purple, olive and light blue. The
dashed curves shows the result of the dot product between the encoded
voxel value and a TF-Node vector for a density of 0.45 in cyan and a
density of 0.85 in orange.
Algorithm 3: Encode Density
Parameters :The normalized density that should be encoded as a
vector with dim dimensions.
Result: Vector v
1 procedure encodeDensity(density, dim)
2 initialize vector v with length dim and set all indices to 0
3 s = density ·2 · (dim−1)
4 f = (bsc+1)/2
5 d = b f c
6 v[d] = 1
7 if d > 0 and d = f then
8 v[d−1] = 1− (s−bsc)
9 else if d+1 < dim and d < f then
10 v[d+1] = s−bsc
11 return normalize (v)
sizing density. The encoding scheme should in any case be chosen in
such a way that the curve created by the dot product is steep and narrow
(see dashed lines in Figure 5), so that the density selected by the user
can be seen as clearly as possible in the resulting image. The Algo-
rithm 3 takes not only the density that should be encoded as parameter,
but also the count of dimensions of the returned vector. Increasing
the count of dimension not only makes the dot product response curve
more steep (See Figure 5 and compare the dashed lines in the left and
right plot.), but also increases the required storage size of the encoded
and encrypted volume dataset. Note that the count of dimensions must
be the same during the encryption of the volume and for the encod-
ing of the user-defined emphasizing density. This also means that the
amount of computations required for the volume rendering depends on
the number of dimensions used for encoding the volume.
5.3 Simplified Transfer Function
It is possible to add RGB colors to the rendered images based on the
density range emphasizing described in the last section. This is useful
because RGB colors allow a user to emphasize different densities
in the same image while keeping the densities distinguishable (see
Figure 6). Since the dot product between an encoded and encrypted
voxel value and a user-defined encoded density is an encrypted scalar
value, a multiplication with another plaintext number is possible. For
our simplified transfer function approach, the dot product result needs
to be multiplied with a user-defined RGB color vector. As the dot
product expresses the similarity between the voxel value and the user-
defined density, the intensity of the resulting RGB color will be high if
the densities are similar, and low otherwise. Since the RGB color vector
is not encrypted, the multiplication between the encrypted dot product
result and the RGB color vector can be archived by three separate
homomorphic multiplications (⊗) of one encrypted and one plaintext
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(a) blue at 0.279, red at 0.797 (b) blue at 0.000, red at 1.000
(c) green at 0.076, blue at 0.651, red at
1.000
(d) blue at 0.000, yellow at 0.293, green
at 0.664, purple at 1.000
Fig. 6. Images are created by our simplified transfer function approach.
The volume data voxel values are encoded by four-dimensional vectors.
The subfigures shows results of different transfer functions applied to the
same encrypted dataset.
number. The result of such a multiplication is an encrypted RGB color.
This calculation can be performed not only for one density-RGB-color-
pair, but also for multiple such pairs. For a better understanding, we
will call such a pair consisting of a density and an RGB color a transfer
function node (TF-Node).
Equation 5 shows the transformation for one encoded and encrypted
voxel value J~vK to an encrypted RGB color J~cvK. The symbol ⊕ is
used instead of ∑, because the sum of encrypted vectors needs to be
calculated. The variable n denotes the count of user defined TF-Nodes.
The vectors ~di and ~ci are the encoded density and RGB color of the
TF-Node with index i. The symbol  is used as operator for a dot
product between one encrypted vector and one plaintext vector.
J~cvK= n⊕
i=0
(J~vK~di)⊗~ci (5)
To obtain the final encrypted RGB color of a pixel, the sum of all
encrypted RGB sample values J~cvK along a viewing ray needs to be
calculated. The total RGB vector needs to be divided by the sample
count as usual for averaging and, furthermore, by the count of TF-
Nodes. This can be achieved by dividing each component of the total
RGB vector by the product of the sample count and the count of TF-
Nodes. The method to approximate a division of an encrypted number
is stated in Equation 1. After calculating this for every image pixel,
the entire encrypted image is sent to the client. A client that knows
the right secure key can now decrypt each RGB component of each
pixel and display the colored image. Example images rendered with
this approach are shown in Figure 1 and Figure 6.
6 RESULTS
All performance tests are executed on a Mac Book Pro (15-inch, 2016)
with an 2.9 GHz Intel Core i7. All algorithms are implemented in Java
and are only single-threaded. The purpose of the implementation is to
prove the concept and, in its current form, is not performance-optimized.
All runtimes shown in Table 1 and Table 3 are measured with volume
size of 100×100×100 voxels. The rendered image always has a size
of 150×150 pixels.
Table 1 shows the runtime performance required for encrypting a
Table 1. X-ray: Required time (in seconds) for encryption, rendering and
decryption with different modulus lengths.
plain 64bit 128bit 256bit 512bit 1024bit 2048bit
ne
ar
es
t
ne
ig
hb
or w
ith
ou
t
ob
fu
sc
at
io
n encrypt 0.46 0.48 0.54 0.56 0.62 0.57
render 0.03 0.54 0.66 0.89 1.61 3.49 9.49
decrypt 0.17 0.25 0.63 2.56 14.92 99.56
w
ith
ob
fu
sc
at
io
n encrypt 5.72 15.36 59.54 327.24 2256.01 16880.00
render 0.03 1.10 1.77 4.18 11.61 37.10 94.30
decrypt 0.21 0.43 1.36 4.94 27.24 185.94
tr
ili
ne
ar
in
te
rp
ol
at
io
n
w
ith
ou
t
ob
fu
sc
at
io
n encrypt 0.46 0.47 0.52 0.57 0.54 0.65
render 0.08 10.59 13.55 21.38 47.25 146.07 487.58
decrypt 0.14 0.26 0.64 2.59 14.65 100.72
w
ith
ob
fu
sc
at
io
n encrypt 5.82 14.67 59.93 330.56 2226.01 16512.47
render 0.08 16.67 23.86 47.07 121.05 385.71 1182.48
decrypt 0.20 0.41 1.20 4.89 26.86 186.38
Table 2. Required storage size for an encrypted volume with 100×100×
100 voxels and different modulus lengths.
plain (8bit) 64bit 128bit 256bit 512bit 1024bit 2048bit
scalar 1 MB 16 MB 32 MB 64 MB 128 MB 256 MB 512 MB
2 dim 2 MB 32 MB 64 MB 128 MB 256 MB 512 MB 1024 MB
3 dim 3 MB 48 MB 96 MB 192 MB 384 MB 768 MB 1536 MB
4 dim 4 MB 64 MB 128 MB 256 MB 512 MB 1024 MB 2048 MB
volume with scalar voxel values, X-ray rendering, and image decryp-
tion with different public key modulus lengths. The table is divided
into four groups of rows. The first two groups show the required time
for rendering with nearest-neighbor sampling. Group three and four
show the resulting performance for trilinear interpolation. The numbers
in group one and three of the Table 1 are measured without obfuscation
during the encryption; therefore, the encrypted volume is not secure.
While this type of “encryption” does not have any practical relevance, it
is interesting to compare these runtime numbers with those in the group
two and four, which are measured from a secure encryption with obfus-
cation. It can be seen that the obfuscation takes a significant amount of
time. Therefore, the random number generation (r) that is required for
the obfuscation and the calculation of rN (see Supplementary Material
Algorithm 5) has a substantial impact on the time required for encrypt-
ing the volume dataset. We use the java.security.SecureRandom
class from the java standard runtime framework as random number
generator for the obfuscation.
Table 2 shows the required memory size for this volume with a single
scalar value per voxel and also for encodings in multiple dimensions
at different modulus lengths. Table 3 shows the runtime required
for encrypting a volume with different voxel encodings (two, three,
and four dimensions), rendering with our simplified transfer function
approach at different counts of TF-Nodes (one, two, ... colors) and
image decryption. The resulting performance for all these operations is
provided for different public key modulus lengths.
The rendering results of Figure 1 show what can be done with our
simplified transfer function. The right image demonstrates the uti-
lization in nuclear medicine. During the diagnosis, these datasets are
usually investigated either by showing single slices or by X-ray render-
ings, where the depth cues are provided through rotating the dataset
around an axis. This is possible with our homomorphic-encrypted
volume rendering with the added privacy, which is useful for diag-
nosing from such a highly sensitive type of modality and associated
pathologies.
7 DISCUSSION
First, we discuss possible performance improvements of our prototype
and how the approach could scale to interactive frame rates for larger
real-world datasets. Later, starting with general noteworthy consid-
erations, we discuss security-related aspects of our volume rendering
approach. Finally, we follow with an explanation for the invisibility of
comparisons. In Section 7.4, we will show that the used floating-point
encoding with an encrypted mantissa and a plaintext exponent does not
weaken the privacy of the encrypted volume data.
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Table 3. Simplified transfer function: required time (in seconds) for
encryption, rendering and decryption with different modulus lengths.
plain 128bit 256bit 512bit 1024bit 2048bit
2
di
m
en
si
on
al
en
co
di
ng
encrypt 29.87 115.03 622.77 4405.69 31796.00
1
co
lo
r render 0.05 21.85 48.59 142.36 544.35 1999.51
decrypt 0.80 1.37 4.95 27.7 180.40
2
co
lo
rs render 0.06 23.38 58.20 131.10 659.48 2716.51
decrypt 0.33 1.18 3.23 27.09 187.51
3
di
m
en
si
on
al
en
co
di
ng
encrypt 40.30 162.22 897.28 6271.48 47030.98
1
co
lo
r render 0.05 19.59 40.21 143.69 560.98 2299.65
decrypt 0.53 0.83 4.47 25.98 127.84
2
co
lo
rs render 0.06 25.87 56.24 154.71 770.64 2850.69
decrypt 0.43 0.80 3.18 27.67 120.99
3
co
lo
rs render 0.06 41.67 89.73 257.51 919.41 3685.33
decrypt 0.59 1.21 4.83 25.46 181.86
4
di
m
en
si
on
al
en
co
di
ng
encrypt 54.97 213.21 1199.68 8512.23 62959.05
1
co
lo
r render 0.06 19.46 42.93 98.08 429.30 2292.48
decrypt 0.28 0.77 1.54 8.50 60.03
2
co
lo
rs render 0.07 35.41 61.60 179.45 729.11 3234.38
decrypt 0.46 0.76 3.10 18.36 121.76
3
co
lo
rs render 0.07 46.41 93.63 268.59 1045.56 4251.69
decrypt 0.45 1.11 4.52 26.15 190.63-
4
co
lo
rs render 0.08 63.57 123.32 343.20 1320.86 5217.38
decrypt 0.67 1.51 4.68 26.82 190.49
7.1 Performance
Our prototype is implemented as a single-threaded application; how-
ever, a major strength of our approach is that it is highly parallelizable
and should scale linearly with the processing power. There are obvious
opportunities to improve the performance to a multi-threaded imple-
mentation, and multiple memory allocations (new statements) during
the rendering could be avoided. During the encryption, every voxel
can be processed independently. Therefore, it should be relatively easy
to use as many processing units (e.g., CPU cores or shader hardware
on GPU) as voxels in the volume for the encryption. In the rendering
and decryption stage, every pixel of the image can be processed inde-
pendently. Therefore, the number of processing units that can be used
efficiently in parallel is equal to the number of pixels in the final image.
Furthermore, a better storage order of voxel values, such as Morton
order [23] (recursive Z curve) extended to three dimensions, could lead
to a better cache usage, which will further improve the performance.
The implementation used for all shown results is based only on a naive
three-dimensional BigInteger array as volume storage.
If we consider a real-world dataset with a resolution of 512×512×
512 voxels encrypted with a perfectly secure 2048bit long key for
the purpose of X-ray rendering with a single value per voxel, the
encrypted dataset will have a size of 64GB (= (5123 · 2048 · 2)/(8 ·
10243)). While this is a considerable data amplification compared
to the 16bit plaintext representation of the dataset with 256MB (=
(5123 ·16)/(8 ·10242)), it will nevertheless perfectly fit in the video-
memory of two NVIDIA Quadro RTX 8000 that have 48 GB of memory
each. An encrypted volume with a four-dimensional encoding for our
simplified transfer function approach will be four times bigger and will,
therefore, have a size of 256GB. Consequently, at least six GPUs with
48GB memory each will be required. While six GPUs in one server is
absolutely possible, our privacy-preserving volume rendering approach
should scale much further. It should be possible to use our proposed
encrypted voxel compositing scheme as mapper for the MapReduce
implementation proposed by Stuart et al. [35], which can make use of a
GPU-accelerated distributed memory system for volume rendering.
7.2 Security Considerations
The data privacy of our approach depends entirely on the security of
Paillier’s cryptosystem. Our approach does not store any voxel value
or any information that is computed from a voxel value without an
encryption by Paillier’s cryptosystem. The Paillier cryptosystem is
semantically secure against chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) [37].
Therefore, we conclude that the data that our approach provides to the
storage and rendering server are protected in a semantically secure way.
The computational complexity required for breaking a secure key of
Paillier’s cryptosystem depends on the length of the modulus N. The
larger the modulus N is, the harder it is to be factorized, which would
be required for data decryption. For the required length of the modulus,
the same conditions as for the RSA cryptosystem [31] should hold.
From 2018 until 2022, a modulus N with a length of at least 2048 bits
is considered to be secure [2, 10].
7.3 Encrypted Comparison Operators
It is not possible to compare encrypted numbers with each other. Dur-
ing the encryption of a number, the obfuscation is performed, which
randomly distributes the encrypted values between 0 an N2−1. There-
fore, the order of the encrypted values JMK has nothing to do with the
order of the underlying numbers M that were encrypted. Consequently,
operators such as lower than (<) or greater than (>) cannot provide
a result that is meaningful for the numbers M, if they are applied to
encrypted values JMK.
We can also argue that comparison operators cannot exist if the Pail-
lier cryptosystem is secure, since the existence of a comparison operator
would break the security of the cryptosystem. Consider a less-than
comparison for example: if such a comparator could be implemented,
every value could be decrypted within log2(N) comparisons by a binary
search. For a modulus N with a length of 2048 bit, an attacker would
need to encrypt and then compare only log2(22048) = 2048 numbers
with the encrypted value JmK in order to find the decrypted number m.
This would effectively break the security of the encryption scheme.
7.4 Plaintext Exponent Does Not Leak Private Data
At first glance, it may look like the floating-point representation (en-
crypted mantissa, plaintext exponent) we used will allow an attacker
to obtain more important information than within an encoding where
all number components are encrypted. However, if it is implemented
correctly, an attacker cannot take any advantage from this number
representation. First, we will discuss this for the data in the server
memory and, in the last paragraph, we will show how the exponent can
be protected during the data transfer from the server to the client.
For the following, we will suppose a secure system with an at least
2048-bit long modulus N and, therefore, a mantissa JmK with at least
600 decimal digits usable in the plaintext domain. Voxel values that are
stored as 10 bit values are probably precise enough for most volume-
rendering use cases. To store numbers between 0 and 210 = 1024, the
exponent e is not required at all, because the voxel information can
be stored only in the mantissa m. Therefore, the exponent e can be 1
for all voxels. This means that the exponent does not even have to be
transferred to the server, because the server can implicitly assume that
the exponents of all numbers is 1. An addition of any of these numbers
that have an exponent of 1 does not change the exponent, because
for an addition, the exponent needs to be taken into account only if
the summands have different exponents (see Algorithm 1). Therefore,
only a multiplication (e.g., an interpolation between voxel values) can
change the exponent to anything other than 1. However, the Paillier
cryptosystem only supports the multiplication of an encrypted number
with an unencrypted number. Consequently, the number d that changes
an exponent has to be unencrypted. Furthermore, this number d can
only depend on unencrypted data, because Paillier does not support
comparison operators (see Section 7.3), which are required for flow con-
trol statements like if or for-loops, and arithmetic operations with
an encrypted number will result in useless random noise, except those
add (⊕) and multiply (⊗) that are defined for the Paillier cryptosystem.
Therefore, the number d can only be the result of some computation
with other unencrypted variables. This implies that d does not need to
be encrypted, because everyone can calculate d itself. In other words,
if the variable d can be computed from some variables that need to be
considered as publicly available, because they are unencrypted, it is
pointless to encrypt d. If d, which is unencrypted and can only depend
8
© 2020 IEEE. This is the author’s version of the article that has been published in IEEE Transactions on Visualization and
Computer Graphics. The final version of this record is available at: xx.xxxx/TVCG.201x.xxxxxxx/
on unencrypted data, influences an exponent, the exponent exposes
only the information that is already publicly available.
The important observation here is that an unencrypted value (e.g.,
an exponent) can influence an encrypted value (e.g., a mantissa), but
an encrypted value (e.g., a mantissa) cannot influence an unencrypted
value (e.g., an exponent). This means that no information that is only
available as encrypted data can ever be exposed in unencrypted values
like the exponent.
In our rendering system, a number d that changes an exponent can
either be the result of a computation with a constant or with an unen-
crypted number that is provided in unencrypted form to the rendering
system, such as the camera properties (position of eye point, opening
angle, view direction...). Therefore, an attacker could possibly learn the
constants used in our program code and data, such as the camera prop-
erties that are provided in the unencrypted form, from the exponents
of the rendering result (the image). However, we want to develop an
approach that is open and semantically secure by design and not secure
through obscurity (compare: [13, 26, 32, 33]). Therefore, we have to
treat the source code of the application as publicly available, which
means that a constant cannot be considered to be private. Furthermore,
for our approach, the camera properties need to be provided in an unen-
crypted form to the rendering system. Therefore, we cannot consider it
as private anyway.
It should be noted that the camera properties could possibly provide
interesting information to an attacker, because it could be possible to
learn something about the volume data by tracking the camera prop-
erties over time. For instance, if a user rotates the camera around a
specific region for a considerable amount of time, an attacker could
guess that the region contains some interesting data. During the transfer
of the camera properties from the client to the server over the network,
the camera properties could be secured by using an encrypted tunnel,
such as IPsec [16] or TLS [29]. However, our basic assumption is
that we cannot trust the server that hosts our rendering program. This
means that an attacker has access to the entire memory of the server
and, therefore, can read the camera properties directly from the memory
of the server, regardless of the used network transfer method. While
the unencrypted camera properties could indirectly expose some infor-
mation, we will not discuss this further because it is beyond the scope
of this work.
Based on the arguments stated in this section, we can conclude that
using plaintext exponents for the rendering process on an untrusted
computer system does not provide more information to a third party
than using encryption for all components of a floating-point number.
The only remaining part that needs to be considered is the transfer
of the final image from the server back to the client across a network.
Operations like trilinear interpolation will change the exponents during
the rendering. Therefore, the final image will contain floating-point
numbers with exponents unequal to 1 and, because the interpolation
weights that change the exponents depend on the camera properties,
the exponents of the final image will provide some information about
the camera properties. The privacy of the information that is stored
in the exponents is only important if it can be assumed that the server
is trustworthy, which contradicts the basic assumption of this work.
Therefore, this is somewhat beyond the scope of this work, but we
nonetheless discuss it here for the sake of completeness. In order to
encrypt as much information as possible during the image transfer from
the server to the client, ideally all information should be stored in the
encrypted mantissa. While it is not possible to divide an encrypted
number, it is possible to multiply an encrypted number. Furthermore,
the encrypted mantissa can store numbers in the range from 0 to 22047.
Therefore, it is possible to bring all exponents to the value of the
smallest exponent of any pixel of the final image. This can be achieved
by the calculation shown in Equation 2. For the new exponent en,
the value of the smallest exponent of any pixel must be used. If this
exponent-decrease operation is applied to all image values on the server
before transferring the image to the client, the exponent should not
contain any important information during the transfer, because all
exponents then contain the same value. However, if there is concern
that even this might contain something useful, it is possible to encrypt
this exponent with the public key because the client that has the secure
key can decrypt it anyway. Since it is the same value for every number
that is sent back to the client, this exponent needs to be sent and
decrypted only once.
8 CONCLUSIONS
While the expressiveness of our renderings is far from what is possible
with state-of-the-art algorithms for non-encrypted data, we have pre-
sented a highly parallelizable direct volume rendering approach that
allows not only the outsourcing of the storage of the volume data, but
also the outsourcing of the whole rendering pipeline, without compro-
mising the privacy of the data. The approach we propose does not leak
any voxel values or any information computed from a voxel value after
the volume encryption. Since we encrypt every single bit of voxel data
with Paillier’s cryptosystem, which is provably semantically secure
(see: [24, 37]), it is rather obvious that with our approach, the confiden-
tiality of the volume data (densities, shapes, structures,..) and the colors
of the rendered image only depends on the privacy of the secure key. If
we trust all devices that have seen the volume data before encryption
(e.g.,: MRI-/CT-scanner, the computer that performs the encryption)
to safely delete the data after encryption, only the owner of the secure
key is able to obtain any useful information of the encrypted volume
or rendered images. This is a significant advantage compared to all
previous works to date.
This security naturally comes with associated costs. The storage
overhead costs for computation are between four and five orders of
magnitude compared to plaintext data. Compared to our prototype, an
optimized implementation of our approach can reduce the computa-
tional complexity by an order of magnitude.
While we hope that further improvements of our approach would
lead to rendering results with better expressiveness, it will be a non-
trivial task because the security aspect needs to be considered for even
the slightest change. Many of the ideas we considered in the algorith-
mic design eventually led to a leak of sensitive information, which is,
in our opinion, intolerable, no matter how small it may be. Future work
definitively needs to improve the rendering performance. We see that
the performance can be tremendously accelerated, as ray-casting is
an embarrassingly parallel workload. For practical utilization of our
privacy-preserving volume rendering, an efficient GPU-based imple-
mentation would be necessary. A single server full with GPUs should
be able to provide five orders of magnitude more computational power
than a single CPU core can. Based on the measured performance with a
non-optimized single threaded implementation, such a server could be
able to achieve interactive frame rates for datasets that are small enough
to fit into the memory of the graphics cards. Therefore, we see, as a
next step, to port the rendering onto GPUs, where the necessary techno-
logical piece will be to design efficient big-integer arithmetic. Another
possible improvement within the scope of Paillier HE will be the visual
quality of compositing. This can be done with gradient-magnitude opac-
ity modulation, where the gradient magnitude will be pre-calculated
and encrypted along with the data values. Such representation can
already lead to substantial visual quality improvement, although it will
still not reach the outcome of compositing using Porter/Duffs’s over
operator [27]. For the Paillier HE scheme, we do not see a way to
implement the over operator compositing, as it requires a multiplication
of encrypted numbers. To support alpha blending, new research should
be oriented on investigating other homomorphic encryption schemes
or a combination of those that, unlike Paillier, would support desired
secure alpha blending functionality.
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL TO THE SUBMISSION
“HOMOMORPHIC-ENCRYPTED VOLUME RENDERING”
A BACKGROUND ON HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
Homomorphic Encryption schemes allow computations on encrypted
data such that the decrypted results are equal to the result of a mathe-
matical or logical operation applied to the corresponding plaintext data.
Therefore, calculations on encrypted data can be performed without
decrypting the data first. This property makes it possible to outsource
not only the storage of encrypted data, but also the computation on sen-
sitive data to untrusted third parties (e.g., the cloud). The computation
on cloud servers has two major advantages. If only the result and not
the whole dataset needs to be transferred to the client, a lower network
bandwidth is required. Furthermore, the client can be a thin client like a
tablet without much computing and storage resources because the com-
putational expensive rendering is done on the server. Homomorphic
encryption schemes are classified into three categories:
• partially homomorphic encryption (PHE): are homomorphic with
regard to only one type of operation (addition or multiplication)
• somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE): Can perform more
general calculations than PHE, but only a limited number of them.
• fully homomorphic encryption (FHE): Can perform any computa-
tion on encrypted data.
Rivest et al. [30] invented the idea of Homomorphic Encryption in 1978.
They showed the demand of a secure Homomorphic Encryption scheme
that supports a large set of operations. However, it took more than 30
years until the first proposal of such a FHE was made by C. Gentry in
2009 [9]. While the first FHE schemes were just concepts, due to an
ongoing development and optimization process, they are currently at
least efficient enough for functional implementations.
However, FHE schemes are still not practical for real applications,
because the storage and computational costs are too high [1, 14, 21].
Therefore, in our approach, we propose to take advantage of the Paillier
PHE scheme, whose homomorphic properties that are relevant for our
encrypted volume rendering will be introduced next.
A.1 The Paillier Cryptosystem
Paillier’s cryptosystem [24] is an additive PHE scheme. The important
property of this scheme is that a multiplication of two encrypted num-
bers is equivalent to an addition in the plaintext domain. This means
that it is possible to calculate the sum of plaintext numbers that have
been encrypted by multiplying the encrypted numbers. This relation
is stated in Equation 6. For Equation 6 and Equation 7, we adopt the
notation by Ziad et al. [38]. The ⊕ symbol is used for the operation
on encrypted numbers that is equivalent to an addition on plaintext
numbers. The encrypted version of the value m is denoted as JmK and
Dec(JmK) = m means decrypting JmK to m by the decryption function
of Paillier’s cryptosystem (see: Algorithm 6).
Paillier works on finite fields and thus performs a modulo (mod N2)
operation after each multiplication ensures to stay in the field and does
not change the decrypted result because the corresponding plaintext
numbers need to be less than the modulus N for a correct decryption
anyway. However, the modulo operation makes further calculations
more efficient because it prevents unnecessary large numbers (n multi-
plications will blow up the number length by about n times).
Dec(Jm1K⊕ Jm2K) = Dec((Jm1K× Jm2K) mod N2)
= (m1 +m2) mod N
(6)
Since it is possible to add encrypted numbers to each other, in a
for-loop, an encrypted number can be added to itself d times to
simulate a multiplication with d. However, note that the value d is in
plaintext. Since addition is performed by doing multiplication on the
encrypted numbers, we can, instead of a for-loop, take the encrypted
value to the power of d to get this result, which can be implemented
more efficiently than a for-loop. Furthermore, it has the advantage
that it also works for d < 0. The case d = −1 is of special interest,
because this makes subtraction of two encrypted numbers possible
Algorithm 4: Paillier Create Keys
Parameters :Length of the modulus N in bit (b).
Result: The secure key (p, q) and the public key (N, g).
1 procedure create(b)
2 repeat
3 p = random prime number with a length of b2 bits
4 q = random prime number 6= p with a length of b2 bits
5 N = p∗q
6 until bitLength(N) = b
7 g = N+1
8 return (p,q) and (N,g)
Algorithm 5: Paillier Encrypt
Parameters :The plaintext message m (< N) that should be
encrypted with the public key (N, g).
Result: Ciphertext c
1 procedure encrypt(m, N, g)
2 r = random number that is smaller than N (r < N)
3 c = gm · rN mod N2
4 return c
(Dec(Jm1−m2K) =Dec(Jm1K×Jm2K−1 mod N2)). The symbol⊗ is
used for such an operation on one plaintext number d and one encrypted
number Jm1K. Equation 7 shows how to calculate this multiplication
with one encrypted number.
Dec(Jm1K⊗d) = Dec(Jm1Kd mod N2)
= (m1×d) mod N
(7)
While the Paillier PHE supports an efficient method to multiply an
encrypted and a plaintext number, it does not support the multiplication
of two encrypted numbers and is, therefore, not a fully homomorphic
encryption scheme.
The Paillier HE is a probabilistic asymmetric encryption scheme
like the well-known RSA scheme [31]. That means that an encryption
can be performed by using the public key, which is derived from the
secure (or private) key. However, for the task of decryption, the secure
key is required, which cannot (efficiently) be calculated from the public
key because this would require factoring a product of two large prime
numbers. It is essential for the security of Paillier’s cryptosystem (and
also for RSA) that there is no known fast method for integer factoriza-
tion of a product of two large prime numbers. The Algorithm 4 shows
an example of a key generation function for the Paillier cryptosystem,
which sets the generator g always to N+1, as this allows a more effi-
cient encryption function (see: [8]). Furthermore, the algorithm clearly
shows that the secure key, which needs to be kept secret, contains the
two large prime numbers p and q (e.g., 1024 bit long) and the public
key contains the product N (e.g., 2048 bit long) of these two prime
numbers.
Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6 show the pseudocode for the encrypt
and decrypt routines for the Paillier HE. The encryption algorithm also
contains the obfuscating of an encrypted number with a random number
r, which qualifies the Paillier HE as a probabilistic encryption scheme.
This means that a specific plaintext message m can be represented by
many possible ciphertexts JmK1,JmK2,JmK3 . . . ,JmKr. The decryption
with the right secure key will return the original message m for all
the possible ciphertext representations. While this is not required for
correct homomorphic calculations with Paillier (imagine r = 1), it is
important for the semantic security against chosen-plaintext attacks
(IND-CPA) that Paillier’s cryptosystem provides [24, 37]. Without this
obfuscating, it would be possible to decrypt datasets without knowing
the secure key because an attacker would only need to encrypt all
possible plaintext values with the public key, store the plaintext and the
corresponding ciphertext values in pairs, and compare the values of the
encrypted dataset with the self-encrypted values for which the correct
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Algorithm 6: Paillier Decrypt
Parameters :The ciphertext c that should be decrypted with the
secure key (p, q) and the public key (N, g).
Result: Plaintext m
1 procedure decrypt(c, p, q, N, g)
// L- and H-function as defined by Paillier [24] at section 7
2 procedure L(x,y)
3 return x−1y
4 procedure H(x)
5 return L(gx−1 mod x2,x)−1 mod x
6 procedure C(mp,mq) // Chinese Remainder Theorem
7 return mp +(((mq−mp) · (p−1 mod q) mod q) · p)
8 hp = H(p) // can be pre computed
9 hq = H(q) // can be pre computed
10 mp = L(cp−1 mod p2, p) ·hp mod p
11 mq = L(cq−1 mod q2,q) ·hq mod q
12 m =C(mp,mq)
13 return m
decryption is known. For datasets with a limited number of possible
values like the voxel values of a volume, which usually contains no
more than 210 = 1024 different values, this would be a trivial task.
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